

United States District Court  
Central District of California

JENER DA SILVA,

Plaintiff,

v.

DARDEN RESTAURANTS, INC.;  
GMRI, INC.; YARD HOUSE USA, INC.;  
YARD HOUSE NORTHRIDGE LLC; and  
DOES 1 through 100,

Defendants.

Case № 2:17-CV-05663-ODW (E)

**ORDER GRANTING  
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO  
COMPEL ARBITRATION [33]**

**I. INTRODUCTION**

Plaintiff Jener Da Silva brings this putative class action against his former employer for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and the California Labor Code. Defendants Darden Restaurants, Inc., GMRI, Inc., Yard House USA, Inc., and Yard House Northridge, LLC ("Defendants"), move to compel arbitration of Plaintiff's claims. This litigation was previously stayed pending the outcome of the Supreme Court's decision in *Epic Systems Corp v. Lewis*, 138 S.Ct. 1612 (2018). (ECF No. 30.) The Supreme Court issued its ruling in *Epic Systems* in May 2018, and

1 Defendants now move again to compel arbitration. (ECF No. 33.) For the following  
2 reasons, the Court **GRANTS** Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration.<sup>1</sup>

## 3 **II. BACKGROUND**

4 Plaintiff was employed at Defendants’ restaurant in Northridge, California from  
5 approximately June 2014 through June 20, 2015. (Compl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff  
6 alleges that during the time of his employment, Defendants failed to pay him, and  
7 other employees similarly situated, all wages due, including minimum wages,  
8 overtime compensation, and necessary expenditures incurred in discharging duties.  
9 (*Id.* ¶ 9.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants did not allow meal and rest periods  
10 and failed to provide accurate itemized wage statements or maintain required records.  
11 (*Id.*)

12 Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit on July 31, 2017, alleging various causes of action  
13 under the FLSA and the California Labor Code, on behalf of himself and a putative  
14 class of Defendants’ current and former non-exempt employees in the State of  
15 California. (*See generally* Compl.) Defendants initially moved to compel arbitration  
16 of Plaintiff’s claims on September 29, 2017, arguing that Plaintiff signed an  
17 agreement containing a mandatory arbitration clause for all “employment-related  
18 disputes.” (ECF No. 18; Dispute Resolution Process Agreement (“DRP”), ECF No.  
19 18-1, Ex. A.)<sup>2</sup> Plaintiff opposed Defendants’ motion, arguing primarily that because  
20 Plaintiff signed the DRP as a condition of his employment and that agreement  
21 contains a waiver of all class and collective actions, the agreement is invalid pursuant  
22 to the Ninth Circuit’s holding in *Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP*, 834 F.3d 975 (9th  
23 Cir. 2016). (Opp’n 3, ECF No. 19.) The Court ordered a stay in this case because the  
24 Supreme Court granted *certiorari* to review *Morris*. (ECF No. 30.) In its opinion in  
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26 <sup>1</sup> Having carefully considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the instant Motion,  
27 the Court deemed the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b);  
C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15.

28 <sup>2</sup> The DRP lays out a four step process the employee or company must go through in lieu of a court  
action. The fourth step in this process is binding arbitration. (*See generally* DRP.)

1 *Epic Systems*, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s holding in *Morris*,  
2 finding that a waiver of collective action contained in an arbitration agreement that  
3 was a condition of employment did not invalidate the agreement. *See Epic Systems*,  
4 138 S.Ct. at 1619–20. Therefore the arbitration agreement in this case could not be  
5 found invalid for the reasons that it was a condition of employment and contained a  
6 waiver of collective actions. After the Court lifted the stay, Defendants moved again  
7 to compel arbitration on June 18, 2018. (Mot. ECF No. 33.) Plaintiff now opposes  
8 Defendants’ motion on the grounds that the FAA does not apply to the DRP, or  
9 alternatively that the DRP is unenforceable because it is unconscionable. (*See*  
10 *generally* Opp’n. ECF No. 34.)

### 11 **III. LEGAL STANDARD**

12 The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) governs a contract dispute relating to an  
13 arbitration provision when that provision “has a substantial relationship to interstate  
14 commerce.” *Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc.*, 245 Cal. App. 4th 227, 234 (2016). When it  
15 applies, the FAA restricts a court’s inquiry into compelling arbitration to two  
16 threshold questions: (1) whether there was an agreement to arbitrate between the  
17 parties; and (2) whether the agreement covers the dispute. *Cox v. Ocean View Hotel*  
18 *Corp.*, 533 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). If the answer to both  
19 questions is affirmative, the FAA requires the Court to enforce the arbitration  
20 agreement according to its terms. *Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc.*, 175 F.3d 716, 719–20  
21 (9th Cir. 1999). The FAA includes a “savings clause” however, which states that an  
22 arbitration agreement may be invalidated “upon such grounds as exist at law or in  
23 equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. This includes generally  
24 applicable contract defenses such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability. *AT&T*  
25 *Mobility LLC v. Concepcion*, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011).

26 Unconscionability has both a procedural and substantive component.  
27 *Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Servs, Inc.*, 24 Cal. 4th 83, 114 (2000).  
28 These two aspects of unconscionability need not be present in the same degree. *Id.* A

1 sliding scale is applied, whereby the more substantive unconscionability is present, the  
2 less procedural is necessary for the contract term to be unenforceable, and vice versa.  
3 *Id.* Procedural unconscionability focuses on oppression or surprise due to unequal  
4 bargaining power. *Id.* The threshold inquiry for procedural unconscionability is  
5 “whether the arbitration agreement is adhesive.” *Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc.*, 469  
6 F.3d 1257, 1281 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting *Armendariz*, 24 Cal. 4th at 113). A contract  
7 of adhesion is a standardized contract, imposed on the party to sign without the  
8 opportunity for negotiation. *Id.* (quoting *Flores v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc.*, 93  
9 Cal. App. 4th 846, 853 (2001)). “[A] finding of a contract of adhesion is essentially a  
10 finding of procedural unconscionability.” *Id.* (quoting *Flores*, 93 Cal. App. 4th at  
11 853). Substantive unconscionability is found when the contract is overly harsh or  
12 one-sided. *Armendariz*, 24 Cal. 4th at 114. In considering substantive  
13 unconscionability, the “paramount consideration” is mutuality of the obligation to  
14 arbitrate. *Nyulassy v. Lockheed Martin Corp.*, 120 Cal. App. 4th 1267, 1287 (2004)  
15 (internal citation omitted). A “modicum of bilaterality” is required to prevent a  
16 finding of substantive unconscionability in an arbitration agreement. *Armendariz*, 24  
17 Cal. 4th at 117.

#### 18 IV. DISCUSSION

##### 19 A. Requests for Judicial Notice

20 Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of three documents in  
21 deciding this motion; (1) the Employment Arbitration Rules and Mediation  
22 Procedures of the American Arbitration Association (“AAA Rules”), (2) the District  
23 Court decision in *Garcia v. GMRI, Inc.* (Case No. 2:12-cv-10152-DMG-PLAx), and  
24 (3) the District Court decision in *Martinez v. Darden Restaurants, Inc.* (Case No.  
25 2:15-cv-3434-GW-GJSx).<sup>3</sup> As these documents are generally known in the Court’s  
26 territorial jurisdiction and can be determined from sources whose accuracy cannot be  
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28 <sup>3</sup> Both *Garcia* and *Martinez* are cases from the Central District of California.

1 questioned, the Court deems they satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence  
2 201(b), and **GRANTS** Defendants’ request for judicial notice.

3 **B. The FAA**

4 This very arbitration agreement has twice been found to be enforceable under  
5 the FAA by judges in the Central District of California. *See Garcia v. GMRI, Inc.*  
6 (Case No. 2:12-cv-10152-DMG-PLAx); *Martinez v. Darden Restaurants, Inc.* (Case  
7 No. 2:15-cv-3434-GW-GJSx). Here, Plaintiff argues that the FAA does not apply to  
8 the arbitration agreement at issue because the agreement does not substantially affect  
9 interstate commerce. (Opp’n 3.) Plaintiff relies on *Carbajal* to draw a parallel to a  
10 situation where a California business which only served California customers was  
11 found not to affect interstate commerce. *Carbajal*, Cal. App. 4th at 239. However,  
12 the situation in *Carbajal* is very different from the one here. *Carbajal* dealt with a  
13 residential painting company which worked with customers within the state of  
14 California. *Id.* The Court finds it very hard to believe, and indeed Plaintiff submits  
15 no evidence to support, that while working at Defendants’ national restaurant chain  
16 Plaintiff served only “California customers.” (Opp’n 4.) Moreover, Defendants  
17 operate 1,536 restaurants across the country, and use the same arbitration agreement  
18 for all of their approximately 150,000 employees. (Mot. 6, 10.) Therefore, the Court  
19 finds that this agreement affects interstate commerce, and application of the FAA is  
20 appropriate.

21 **C. Plaintiff’s Claims Subject to Arbitration**

22 The arbitration agreement at issue in this case satisfies the two requirements for  
23 the Court to compel the enforcement of its terms. First, both parties clearly agreed to  
24 arbitrate. On June 12, 2014, Plaintiff signed the DRP Acknowledgement which states:  
25 “I understand that this arbitration agreement requires that disputes that involve the  
26 matters subject to the agreement be submitted to mediation or arbitration . . . .” (Decl.  
27 of Melissa Ingalsbe (“Ingalsbe Decl.”), Ex. B, ECF No. 33-1.) This document was  
28 also signed by a manager/director representative of Defendants. (*Id.*) The DRP also

1 clearly covers the claims that make up this dispute. It plainly states that it applies to  
2 “all employment-related disputes or claims,” including but not limited to “disputes  
3 about compensation earned.” (Ingalsbe Decl., Ex. A (“DRP”), ECF No. 33-1.) As  
4 both of these threshold questions have been answered in the affirmative, the Court  
5 must compel enforcement of the arbitration agreement according to its terms, unless  
6 the agreement may be invalidated according to a traditional contract defense.

#### 7 **D. Unconscionability**

##### 8 **a. Procedural Unconscionability**

9 Plaintiff is correct to assert that this agreement contains elements of procedural  
10 unconscionability. This contract was provided to Plaintiff on a “take it or leave it”  
11 basis, as a condition of his employment. (Ingalsbe Decl. ¶ 10.) Defendants, as a large  
12 corporate employer had significantly more bargaining power, making this a contract  
13 of adhesion. *See Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc.*, 28 Cal.3d 807, 817 (1981). Arbitration  
14 agreements contained in contracts of adhesion are often found by courts to be  
15 procedurally unconscionable. *See Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co.*, 733 F.3d 916,  
16 922–23 (9th Cir. 2013); *Armendariz*, 24 Cal. 4th at 114–15; *McManus v. CIBC World*  
17 *Markets Corp.*, 109 Cal. App. 4th 76, 91 (2003).

18 Additionally, the DRP is subject to the AAA Rules, but these were not provided  
19 to the Plaintiff. (Opp’n 9.) Not providing the rules which govern an arbitration  
20 agreement has also been found to be procedurally unconscionable, on the basis of  
21 unfair surprise. *Trivedi v. Curexo Tech. Corp.*, 189 Cal. App. 4th 387, 393 (2010).<sup>4</sup>  
22 *See also Fitz v. NCR Corp.*, 118 Cal. App. 4th 702, 72–23 (2004) (finding procedural  
23 unconscionability when arbitration rules were not attached and employee was required  
24 to obtain them from another source). Further, Defendants do not specify which  
25 version of the AAA Rules would be controlling on the claim (those at time of  
26 contracting or those at the time of arbitration, for example) and a failure to so specify

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27  
28 <sup>4</sup> *Trivedi* is disapproved of by *Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc.*, 62 Cal.4th 1237 (2016), on grounds relating to substantive, not procedural, unconscionability.

1 has been found to heighten procedural unconscionability. *Harper v. Ultimo*, 113 Cal.  
2 App. 4th 1402, 1407 (2003). The Court therefore finds this agreement to contain  
3 elements of procedural unconscionability.

#### 4 **b. Substantive Unconscionability**

5 The “paramount consideration” of substantive unconscionability is the  
6 mutuality of the obligation to arbitrate. *Nyulassy*, 120 Cal. App. 4th at 1287.  
7 However, only a “modicum of bilaterality” is required for a finding of conscionability.  
8 *Armendariz*, 24 Cal. 4th at 117. The court in *Armendariz* also recognized:  
9 “unconscionability turns not only on a ‘one-sided’ result, but also on the absence of  
10 ‘justification’ for it.” *Id.*

11 Here, Plaintiff claims that the agreement lacks mutuality in part because the  
12 first two steps of the DRP, “Open Door” and “Peer Review” are to be utilized only by  
13 the employee, not the company.<sup>5</sup> (Opp’n 11.) First, the DRP clearly states that “Open  
14 Door” is “always available to Employees or the Company” so it is not exclusive to  
15 employees. (DRP 2.) While the Court agrees that a process of reporting to a superior  
16 is more likely to be utilized by employees rather than the company, this is not  
17 dispositive of mutuality. Indeed, the fact that the company does not have a supervisor  
18 to whom to bring a grievance seems an adequate justification to exempt the company  
19 from this first step of the DRP. Also, this exemption is based on “business realities” of  
20 the type accepted by the *Armendariz* court. *Id.* Additionally, Plaintiff is mistaken  
21 regarding “Peer Review” as the plain language of the DRP states: “Steps two and  
22 three of the DRP – Peer Review and Mediation – apply to all . . . disputes or claims  
23 brought by the Employee against the Company or *the Company against the*  
24 *Employee. . . .*” (DRP 2) (emphasis added).

25 The Court disagrees with Plaintiff’s suggestion that the DRP is one-sided  
26 because it exempts issues related to “wage rates, wage scales, or benefits, performance

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27 <sup>5</sup> “Open Door” is the first step in the DRP, which requires employees to bring grievances to the  
28 attention of their manager or supervisor. “Peer Review” is the second step of the process, which  
allows either party to present an issue to a panel of three employees. (DRP 4.)

1 standards or ratings, work rules, food quality and service standards, or company  
2 policies or procedures . . . .” (DRP 2.) This is because the continuation of that quote,  
3 as noted by Defendants, states “unless these disputes are brought pursuant to a specific  
4 federal or state statute, or other applicable legal standard.” (*Id.*) In other words, any  
5 complaints related to those issues would fall under the DRP if they raised a legal  
6 claim, regardless of who brought the issue. The company’s claims in those areas are  
7 not exempted from the DRP, but rather any issue brought by either party which does  
8 not raise a legal claim.

9 Plaintiff next argues that the DRP is substantively unconscionable because it  
10 impermissibly shifts fees and costs. (Opp’n 13.) As the employee is only responsible  
11 for the same fees and costs they would be responsible for in court, the Court finds that  
12 the DRP does not shift fees and costs. The Court agrees with Defendants’ that it is  
13 well settled that a plaintiff must bear their attorney’s fees and costs during the  
14 pendency of litigation. (Reply 7, ECF No. 35.) Should the employee prevail on their  
15 claim in arbitration, they have the same ability to recover attorney’s fees and costs that  
16 they would have in a court of law. (DRP 8.) Furthermore, the DRP provides that the  
17 company will pay “the arbitrator’s fees and expenses, any costs of the hearing facility,  
18 and any costs of the arbitration service.” (DRP 7.) In sum, the employee is not liable  
19 for any expenses beyond those that they would incur bringing an action in court.

20 As unconscionability is determined as a sliding scale between procedural and  
21 substantive unconscionability, even a strong showing of procedural unconscionability  
22 requires at least some substantive unconscionability for the contract term to be invalid.  
23 In this case, while there is procedural unconscionability present in the DRP, there is  
24 no substantive unconscionability, and so the Court orders the parties to comply with  
25 the terms of the arbitration agreement.

#### 26 **E. Application of the *Armendariz* Test**

27 The Court in *Armendariz* set forth a stringent standard that arbitration  
28 agreements must meet in order to be enforced. Under that standard, an arbitration



1 agreement: (1) must be mutual; (2) must provide for a neutral arbitrator; (3) may not  
2 limit statutorily imposed remedies; (4) must allow adequate discovery; (5) must  
3 require a written decision by the arbitrator; (6) may not require the employee to pay  
4 unreasonable costs and arbitrator fees. *Armendariz*, 24 Cal. 4th at 91, 101–13.

5 Defendants argue that *Armendariz* has been overruled by *AT&T Mobility LLC*  
6 *v. Concepcion* 563 U.S. 333 (2011) and a less stringent standard applies. (Mot. 17.)  
7 In the opinion of the Court, the agreement satisfies the stricter standard from  
8 *Armendariz*. Therefore, the agreement should be enforced whether or not the standard  
9 was relaxed by *AT&T Mobility*, and the Court need not issue a holding today on  
10 whether *Armendariz* was, in fact, overruled.

11 First, the DRP is mutual because both the employee and the company must  
12 submit all DRP-eligible disputes to arbitration (see as well the discussion of mutuality  
13 in the section on substantive unconscionability, above). (DRP 2.) Second, the DRP  
14 provides for a neutral arbitrator, referred by the American Arbitration Association.  
15 (*Id.* at 6, 9.) Third, the DRP does not limit remedies, the arbitrator has the same  
16 power as a court of law to award remedies. (*Id.* at 8.) Fourth, the DRP allows for  
17 adequate discovery by granting both parties the right to subpoena documents and  
18 witnesses for the arbitration hearing. (*Id.*) Fifth, the DRP states the arbitrator will  
19 issue a written decision. (*Id.*) Sixth, the DRP does not require the employee to pay  
20 unreasonable fees or costs. (*Id.* at 7.)

21 As it meets all of the requirements of the stringent *Armendariz* standard, the  
22 Court finds that this is a valid arbitration agreement even under that standard.

### 23 **F. Dismissal of Action**

24 “Under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), if a federal district court determines  
25 that a suit is subject to an arbitration agreement, it shall, on application of a party, stay  
26 the litigation pending arbitration.” *Walker v. BuildDirect.com Tech., Inc.*, 733 F.3d  
27 1001, 1004 (10th Cir. 2013); 9 U.S.C. § 3. In the Ninth Circuit, the district court has  
28 discretion to dismiss a party’s complaint where the court finds that the arbitration

1 clause ensnares all of the party's claims. *See Sparling v. Hoffman Const. Co., Inc.*,  
2 864 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988) ("9 U.S.C. section 3 gives a court authority, upon  
3 application by one of the parties, to grant a stay pending . . . [compliance with the  
4 contractual] arbitration clause . . . . [T]he provision [does not, however,] limit the  
5 court's authority to grant a dismissal . . . ."); *see also Azoulai v. La Porta*, No. CV 15–  
6 06083–MWF–PLA, 2016 WL 9045852, at \*5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2016) (dismissing  
7 action after compelling arbitration).

8 All of the claims alleged by Plaintiff fall within the scope of the arbitration  
9 agreement he signed. The first through eight claims alleged in Plaintiff's complaint  
10 all qualify as "employment-related disputes" expressly covered by the DRP.<sup>6</sup>  
11 Plaintiff's ninth claim, Unfair and Unlawful Business Practices, is derivative of the  
12 first eight claims as Plaintiff alleges that Defendants' failure to pay the proper wages  
13 and keep the correct records at issue in claims one through eight is the basis for  
14 Defendants' unfair business advantage. "To require arbitration, [Plaintiff's] factual  
15 allegations need only 'touch matters' covered by the contract containing the  
16 arbitration clause and all doubts are to be resolved in favor of arbitrability." *Simula*,  
17 175 F.3d at 721. This claim clearly touches matters covered by the arbitration clause,  
18 and is therefore ensnared by the arbitration clause as well.

19 Finally, Plaintiff's tenth claim is a collective action under the FLSA. In *Epic*  
20 *Systems* the Supreme Court held that prohibitions on class action are permissible in  
21 arbitration agreements, and so Plaintiff is unable to bring this collective action. *See*  
22 *Epic Systems Corp v. Lewis* 138 S.Ct. 1612 (2018).

23 As the Court has found that the parties' arbitration agreement covers all of the  
24 Plaintiff's claims, this action must be **DISMISSED**.

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25 <sup>6</sup> Plaintiff's first eight causes of action are: (1) Failure to Provide Required Meal Periods; (2) Failure  
26 to Provide Authorize and Permit Rest Periods; (3) Failure to Pay Minimum Wages; (4) Failure to  
27 Pay Overtime Wages; (5) Failure to Pay All Wages Due to Discharged and Quitting Employees; (6)  
28 Failure to Furnish Accurate Itemized Wage Statements; (7) Failure to Maintain Required Records;  
(8) Failure to Indemnify Employees for Necessary Expenditures Incurred in Discharge of Duties.  
(Compl.)


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**V. CONCLUSION**

For the forgoing reasons the Court **GRANTS** Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration (ECF No. 33), and **DISMISSES** the case. The Clerk of the Court shall close this case.

**IT IS SO ORDERED.**

July 20, 2018



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**OTIS D. WRIGHT, II**  
**UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE**